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1.1 "Required" modifiers 
Middles, habituals and kind generics, many passives, and some adjectival 
passives seem to require either an overt adverbial or some other kind of verbal 
modifier. Although in many cases the "modification" may be contextually 
provided rather than overtly expressed, some kind of restriction on the class of 
eventualities designated by the main verb seems necessary (for well-formedness 
or felicity). Focusing on the so-called middle in English, this paper sketches the 
phenomenon and lays out some of the issues raised, suggesting lines for further 
inquiry. The major questions it raises are these: 
( 1 )  What defect(s) do middle modifiers remedy? 
(2) How do they do it? 
And it looks ahead to but does not explicitly address the larger question: 
(3) What (if any) significant syntactic/semantic/pragmatic generalizations can be 
made about the defect( s) and remedies for different classes of expressions? 
Although the discussion explicitly considers only English data, there is 
certainly evidence that modifier-neediness is not confined to English expressions 
(for cross-linguistic discussion of middles and the need for modifiers, see, e.g., 
Fagan 1 992 and Fellbaum & Zribi-Hertz 1 989). 
1.2 Delimiting the data 
Here is a sampling of modifier-needy expressions in English. Although an 
asterisk is used in front of parentheses to indicate non-optionality of some 
expression like that in the parentheses (or in some cases of something provided 
contextually that functions like the parenthesized expressions), I do not thereby 
claim that missing modifiers result in ungrammaticality or even semantic ill­
formedness. The requirement for modifiers may well be linked to pragmatic 
constraints (perhaps of a linguistically conventional kind, as suggested for ill!Y by 
Kadmon & Landman 1 993) .  Nor do I want to prejudge the question of whether 
the defect so indicated is exactly the same for all the kinds of expressions 
exemplified. 
English middles need modifiers: 
( 1 )  Taurus handles *(well/like a racing car). 
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(2) This toy assembles *(quickly/with only a screw driver) . 
(3) Babies comfort *(readily/with great difficulty) . 
(4) That piano plays *(superbly/in tune). 
(5) Joan's dissertation reads * (well/like a mystery novel). 
Stress or a negative or a modal or an interrogative can in some cases seem to 
provide what is needed: 
(6) Now, this car HANDLES.  
(7) She doesn't flatter. 
(8) That piano should play. 
(9) Does this dress wash? 
As these examples suggest, contexts in which applicability of the middle 
without an overt modifier might distinguish among potential subjects (some 
dresses wash, others need to be dry-cleaned) are ones in which the middle might 
occur with no explicit indicator of restrictions. We might, e.g., answer (9) with 
( l Oa), which is roughly equivalent to ( l Ob). 
( 1 0) a. Yes, this dress washes. 
b. This dress is washable. 
It is relatively rare, however, to fmd English middles without modifiers. Sentence 
(5) with no modifiers is just crashingly bad; it cannot be understood as equivalent 
to the well-formed ( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 )  Joan' s dissertation i s  readable. 
Habituals seem to need modifiers: 
( l 2) Mary walks a mile *(every morning/to work). 
( 1 3) Sandy looks in a mirror *(seldomlwhenever bored) 
Modifier-less habituals seem more readily rescued by context than middles. For 
example, ( 1 2) and ( 1 3) with no modifiers are fine if understood as answers to 
questions like ( 1 4) or ( 1 5).  
( l4) What does Mary do for exercise every day? 
( 1 5) How does Sandy always know who's  walked in behind her? 
Virtually any habitual seems rescuable contextually. In this respect, habituals 
contrast with middles like (5). 
Passives sometimes seem to be modifier-needy: 
( l 6) That house was built * (by my mother/to last/very solidly). 
( 1 7) This position is *(widely) held *(by many linguists) 
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[Ex. from Grimshaw and Vikner 1 993] 
In the case of ( 1 6), one might speculate that the problem is that all houses are 
built (they don't just spring into existence) ; thus ( 1 6) is pragmatically deficient 
because it fails to distinguish "that house" from others. (We'll see that 
explanations of modifier-neediness in middles often also look to the requirement 
for classifying or distinguishing sUbjects.) Although some kind of pragmatic 
requirement to help draw distinctions may well be operative, it is not immediately 
clear how such an account can help with ( 17), given that ( 1 8) is fine (and can 
even be true). 
( 1 8) This position is held by no one. 
Even more tellingly, ( 1 9) seems fine though, on the assumption that all houses are 
built, it is no more informative than the bizarre modifierless ( 1 6) .  
( 1 9) That house was built by someone or other (or by some mechanical device). 
Note, however, that many passives do not seem modifier-needy. 
(20) Her home was destroyed. 
(2 1 )  [Guess what ! ]  Dewey was defeated/elected. l 
Adjectival passives also sometimes need modifiers, even when the 
corresponding passive is not particularly modifier-needy: 
(22) a. That is a *(well/un-) supported theory. 
b. That theory seems to be supported. 
The contrast between the adjectival passive (22a) and the verbal passive (22b) 
suggests that no purely pragmatic account of modifier-neediness will suffice. 
Finally, we should note that not all obligatory adverbials are modifiers: 
(23) Jan treated Chris *(badly/with great tact) 
[ cpo behaves] 
(24) Pedro resides *(in Providence/with his mother) 
[cp. m!!] 
(25) The meeting lasted *(a long time/for an hour/until 7) 
The manner, locative, and temporal expressions in (23)-(25) respectively are verbal 
arguments and not modifiers. They are semantically specific and selected by the 
verb. Letting M be a variable over "manners," we might, e.g., give behave a 
Davidsonian or neo-Davidsonian representation as in 
(26) a. AMAxAe behave(M)(x)(e) 
b. AMAxAe (behave(e) & Manner(M)(e) & Agent(x)(e)) 
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Modifiers that rescue middles like those in ( 1 )-(5) are not arguments of either the 
base transitive verb or the (derived) middle. Thus obligatory adverbials are not 
always diagnostic of modifier-neediness. 
2.1 Characterizing middles 
Let us turn now to look more closely at the syntactic and semantic 
structure of what we are calling middles in English. 
2.1.1 Transitivity alternations 
Middles are like passives and ergatives in being (at least superficially) 
intransitive counterparts of derivationally related transitives. 
( 1 )  a. Her hair combs beautifully. 
b. The beautician combed her hair. 
(2) a. Her hair was combed by the beautician. 
b. The beautician combed her air. 
(3) a. The lake froze. 
b. She froze some fruit juice to put in the punch. 
I assume without argument that middle formation is a matter of something like 1-
syntax (Hale & Keyser 1993) or the "dynamic lexicon" (Fagan 1 992). That is, 
there is some kind of regular word-formation process that shares many of its 
structural features with syntactic derivations but is nonetheless " lexical . "  
More specifically, middles, passives, and ergatives share property A: 
A. The surface subject or external argument of the intransitive form (as in l a-3a) 
is to be identified (in some way) with the internal argument (direct object) of 
the related transitive (as in Ib-3b) . 
Many analysts have argued, however, that middles and ergatives differ 
from passives in having property B:  
B .  The surface intransitive does not express the external argument of the 
transitive. 
Here is some evidence for that claim. Examples (2)-(4) show that agentive .Qy­
phrases, purposive clauses, and adverbs assigning special properties to a "do-er" 
are allowed in passives but disallowed in both middles and ergatives. 
(2) a. The book was read by many people. 
b. The punch bowl was sold to raise money for medicine. 
c. The car was handled skillfully. 
(3) a. *The book reads well by many people. 
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b. *The punch bowl sold to raise money for medicine. 
c. *The car handled skillfully. 
(4) a. *The ice melted by the sun. 
b. *The ice melted to protect from falls. 
c. *The ice melted skillfully. 
But Stroik ( 1 99 1 )  and others have used examples like those in (5) to argue 
against B ' s  holding for middles. 
(5) a. The car handles well for Gina but not for Lou. 
b. Articles about oneself never read well. 
Zribi-Hertz (1 992) argues that (5b) involves logophoricity; I recommend her 
discussion to those who think (5b) shows a syntactically present agent. She also 
claims that (5a) is to be explained without appeal to a syntactically present agent, 
though she seems to suggest that the for-phrase in (5a) is simply a beneficiary. 
As Stroik notes, (5a) does imply that Gina is somehow responsible for handling 
the car or " in control" of the car and not simply a beneficiary. In other words, 
Gina in some sense exhibits agency. But consider (6a), roughly equivalent to (6b). 
(6) a. The baby sleeps for you but not for me. 
b. The baby sleeps when you're in charge [or: on the scene] but not when 
I 'm in charge. 
Here too the for-object seems to be exerting "control" but there is no question of 
its being the agent of the event designated by the main verb. So sentences like 
(5a) do not provide evidence for the presence of an (implicit) agent of handle any 
more than sentences like (6b) provide evidence for an (implicit) agent of sleep. 
If middles are like ergatives in not having an expressed agent, then just 
how do they differ from ergatives? First, ergatives are not at all modifier-needy: 
(7) a. The ice melted. 
b. The door opened. 
And although (apparent) middles like those in (8) do not express agents, they do 
seem to entail active transitives like those in (9) and thus agents. 
(8) a. Jane's  exercise bike assembled very quickly. 
b. Mother' s punch bowl sold for $ 1 000. 
(9) a. Someone/thing assembled Jane's  exercise bike quickly. 
b. Someone/thing sold Mother' s  punch bowl for $ 1 000. 
In contrast the ergatives in (7) do not entail related causatives like those in ( 1 0) 
(although of course the converse entailments do hold). 
( 1 0) a. Someone/thing melted the ice. 
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b. Someone/thing opened the door. 
The sentences in ( 1 1 )  affirm those in (7) and deny those in ( 1 0) .  
( 1 1 )  a. 
b. 
The ice melted by itself. 
The door opened by itself. 
In contrast, the sentences in ( 1 2) are quite bizarre. 
( 12) a. 
b. 
*Jane's exercise bike assembled very quickly by itself. 
*Mother' s punch bowl sold for $ 1 000 by itself. 
Middles but not ergatives thus seem to have property C: 
C. The surface intransitive incorporates reference to the same class of events as 
its active transitive counterpart; although no agent is expressed, agency of 
some kind is nonetheless semantically implied. 
Many analyses treat the middle as somehow derived from its transitive 
counterpart, whereas many treat ergatives as basic intransitives from which 
causative transitives may be derived. This difference in derivation, of course, 
links to property C. 
2.1.2 Two kinds of middles? 
Middles are (usually) generics, general statements rather than simple event 
descriptions. Notice, e.g. ,  that the bare plural subjects in ( 1 )  cannot be interpreted 
existentially. 
( 1 )  a. Steinways play superbly. 
b. Young babies startle readily. 
These sentences ascribe properties to members of the kind rather than reporting 
events in which (perhaps only some) members participated. And this is true even 
when the middle does imply the occurrence of some particular event, as the past 
tense (2a), which entails (2b) IF the parenthesized material is omitted. 
(2) a. Joan's dissertation read very well. 
b. Someone read Joan' s dissertation (very well) . 
c. Joan's dissertation was very good to read. 
(2a) thus is equivalent to something like (2c); it presupposes, however, and does 
not assert the occurrence of an event like that reported in (2b) without the optional 
modifier. 
But if we identify middles just on the basis of the transitivity alternations 
discussed above, then some middles do indeed seem to report events as the attested 
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examples in (3) show: 
(3) a. The punch bowl (finally) sold. 
b. Flight 3870 (has) canceled. 
The basic truth-conditions for the event-reporting middles III (3) seem 
indistinguishable from those for the passives in (4) : 
(4) a. The punch bowl was (finally) sold. 
b. Flight 3870 has been canceled. 
( 1 )  and (2) contain the relatively common property middles; (3) contains what 
we'll provisionally call an eventive middle, much rarer in English. 
Eventive middles seldom seem to need modifiers, as indicated by the 
optionality of the parentheses in (3). Yet eventives are like the property middles 
and unlike passives in having inaccessible agents; namely, property B discussed 
above. Here' s  another diagnostic for that inaccessibility. (5a) and (5b) are both 
appropriate after the passives in (4) yet only (5b) can follow the middles in (3).  
(5) a. And just who sold/canceled it? 
b. *By whom? 
The syntactic inaccessibility of agents in eventive middles seems to provide 
counter-evidence to the proposal in Roberts ( 1 986) that the need of middles for 
modifiers is due to the syntactic inaccessibility of their agents. If agent 
inaccessibility is what drives the need for modifiers, then eventives should differ 
from passives in needing modifiers. Apparently, however, the inaccessibility of 
agents does not result in eventives needing modifiers. 
It seems that it is only property middles for which modifier need is an 
issue. The major reason for not calling eventive middles ergatives or (derived) 
unaccusatives is that they do seem to contrast with the usual instances of ergatives 
in semantically entailing the existence of an agent. But perhaps these intransitive 
eventives like sell and cancel in (3) are not lexically derived from their transitive 
homonyms in the same way as middles, being instead basic intransitive predicates. 
If so, then their implied "agents" may have a rather different status from those 
implied in property middles. If we take this line, then "agent inaccessibility" 
could be involved in explaining modifier-neediness. That is, property middles 
differ from so-called eventive middles in incorporating reference to an agent 
(though, crucially, not allowing that agent to be "accessible" to, e.g. , .!2y-pbrase 
modification). In other words, a revised Property C might hold of property 
middles but not eventives. Notice that even events like ice melting or a door 
opening are "caused" ; it' s  just that the cause need not be identifiable as some 
external agent. Likewise, the sale of a bowl or the canceling of a flight is 
"caused" but in such cases we find it hard to think of causes not readily identified 
as agents (no "by itself' seems possible, given the nature of the events), which 
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may be why we are inclined (on this view, misleadingly) to think of these 
eventives as evincing Property C and thus being middles rather than ergatives. 
Whether or not we adopt the view that eventives like those in (3) are to be 
classed as ergatives and not as middles, what is clear is that they lack both the 
generic modal character of prototypical "property" modals and their modifier­
neediness. And, as we will see below, eventive subjects are genuinely non­
thematic, which seems not true of standard middle subjects. 
2.2 Middles and tough-movement 
Massam ( 1 992) proposes that (non-eventive or "property") middles and 
tough-movement constructions are very similar, both syntactically and 
semantically; semantically, this proposal has considerable intuitive appeal. 
Suggestively, the tough-movement sentences in b. and the related impersonals in 
c. more or less paraphrase the middles in a. 
( 1 )  a. This bread cuts easily. 
b. This bread is easy to cut. 
c. It is easy to cut this bread. 
(2) a. This bread toasts well .  
b. This bread is good to toast. 
c. It is good (satisfactory?) to toast this bread. 
(c' . It produces good results to toast this bread) 
(c" .  Toasting this bread produces good results.) 
(3) a. Some silks wash. 
b. Some silks are possible/feasible to wash. 
(b' . Some silks can be washed.) 
(b" .  Some silks are washable.) 
c.  It is possible/feasible to wash some silks. 
Here are some further immediately obvious parallels: 
A. Both kinds of sentences are stative. 
B.  Both have a surface subject identified with the null object position of a 
transitive verb. 
C. Both " involve a secondary semantics which imposes a 'property' onto the 
derived [Le . ,  surface] subject. " (Massam 1 992, 1 26). 
I ' ll discuss C. in more detail in my next section, but for now let us just note that 
this "secondary semantics" is absent from the impersonal tough-constructions in 
the c. sentences of ( 1 )-(3) but present in both the middles in the a. sentences and 
their tough-moved counterparts in the b. sentences. 
Massam's  analysis suggests further parallels: 
D. Both surface subjects are base-generated in what look like VP-extemal non­
thematic positions [note that Massam's work does not incorporate the VP-
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shell hypothesis; what matters here is simply whether the surface subject is 
considered to be generated in some position distinct from that of the object 
position to which it is also in some way linked] . 
E. Both constructions involve a base-generated "empty (or resumptive) element 
in the thematic Case-marked (object) position. " ( 1 26) 
But she treats the empty object differently in the two cases :  
F .  In tough-constructions, the base-generated empty object moves to Spec of CP 
where it serves as an empty operator binding a (wh) trace in object position; 
in LF, the "non-thematic" subject is co-indexed with this A-bar chain by 
predication. 
F' . In middles, the empty object is a null reflexive; i .e . ,  a Case-marked anaphoric 
element requiring local co-indexing. 
She argues that the object in middles is like that in recipe contexts: 
(4) a. Take out the eggs; and [disc topicl break [refll into bowl. 
b. *You take out the eggs; and break [refl]j into bowl. 
The recipe-context null objects must be bound from a null subject position, filled 
in, Massam suggests by preceding discourse. Although the string in (4b) can be 
interpreted it has to be understood as linking the empty object to the you in 
subject position of the first clause, which preempts other discourse topics. The 
interpretation thereby produced of the second clause is, in fact a "middle, "  
somewhat bizarre in having "you" broken into the bowl. 
Most of Massaro's arguments for the base-generated null obj ect are 
syntactic, connected to such issues as the impossibility of middles with stranded 
prepositions, over ECM verbs, in double object constructions, etc. That is, 
middles don't really look syntactically as if there' s  been movement. Further 
support for the view that the middle subject itself is not base-generated in the 
direct object position comes from the impossibility of having idiom chunk object 
NPs as subjects of middles, in this way also paralleling tough-movement 
structures. Compare, e.g., (5a), (5b), (5c), and (5d). 
(5) a. Honey keeps easily in glass jars. 
b. *Tabs keep easily on foreign agents in Washington. 
c. It is easy to keep tabs on foreign agents in Washington. 
d. *Tabs are easy to keep on foreign agents in Washington. 
There is thus strong support for the view that middles are control rather than 
raising structures. 
It is also suggestive that many languages use overt reflexive morphology 
in middle constructions (e.g., French and German) .  Even English occasionally has 
overt reflexives in middle-like contexts. Massaro gives examples like these: 
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(6) a. This floor practically washes itself. 
b. The analysis bases itself on the notion that . . .  
[Ex. from one of Massam's referee reports ! ]  
The difference in the nature of the null objects in middles and tough­
constructions should not obscure the critical parallel Massam draws in their 
identification. 
G. The LF co-indexation of the "non-thematic" subject and the empty object is 
"licensed" by a tough-expression in !NFL. In middles, the licenser is a modal 
(possibly phonologically null) or adverbial (moved into INFL at LF); in 
tough-movement, an adjective. 
In a sense, what Massam is doing is locating the main "import" of middles not in 
the middle predicate itself but in some kind of modal and/or evaluative element. 
This element may sometimes be directly expressed by a modifier but in any case 
must be somehow linked to a modifier or an appropriate discourse-given element. 
On this proposal, tough-constructions do involve movement but not of the 
lexical NP in subject position. Omitting irrelevant details and extrapolating from 
Massam's discussion, the proposed structure of (7a) seems to be something like 
(7b) : 
(7) a. This car is tough to handle. 
b.  IP 
�I '  
� 
I VP 
/� 
�P 
/"--. Sl'ec C' 
�IP � 
NP VP 
I /"-. 
I I r jP 
This carj be; t; tough dpj to PRO handle � 
In contrast, middle (8a) has a structure something like (8b). 
(8) a. This car handles easily. 
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(The dotted line represents LF movement) 
Massam's account has the virtue of treating modifiers that "rescue" middles 
as providing what is in some sense the main predicate of the middle construction, 
thus accounting immediately for their obligatory status. Questions remain. Can 
the "rescuing" be derived rather than stipulated? Why are particular elements able 
to rescue middles? Is the rescuer always a tough-element; i.e., an event-property 
or relation of an individual to an event? Under what conditions may modification 
be provided contextually? What is the relevance ofthe "secondary" semantics that 
seems to assign these "non-thematic subjects" some kind of significant property 
with respect to applicability of the tough-element (i.e., the implied feasibility, etc. 
of a process or satisfactoriness of results) . 
2.3 The "secondary" semantics of middle subjects 
Middle (and tough-movement) subjects get interpreted not only as playing 
the thematic role associated with the internal argument of the input transitive verb 
(in the case of tough-movement, the embedded verb) but also as having a property 
by virtue of which they play some kind of causal or quasi-agent role. (See, e.g.,  
van Oosten 1 977, 1 986; as noted in 2. 1 .2, this causally relevant property 
interpretation surfaces only in non-eventive middles.) 
Note that ( la) is better than ( l b), presumably because it makes explicit a 
causally relevant property. 
( 1 )  a. Small cars park easily. 
b. ?Cars park easily. 
c. It is easy to park cars. 
And notice that the modifier that rescues the middles in (2) does so by suggesting 
that the subject is similar in its relevant properties to something else for which, 
presumably, we know characteristic effects produced as thematic participant in 
events of the kind designated by the base verb: 
(2) a. Your dissertation read like a Harlequin romance. 
On the Non-Optionality of Certain Modifiers 
b. Since it' s  been tuned, the piano plays like a new instrument. 
Of course, the rescuing modifier in (2) does two jobs: it not only attributes 
to the subject certain properties shared with the object of like but it also gives 
content to what Massam calls the tough-element, saying that events in which the 
subject is V-ed are (generally) similar in some important respect to events in 
which the like-object is V -ed, there being an assumption that we know what V -ing 
such objects is (generally) like. 
Roughly, the "extra" semantic content of ( l a) compared to ( I c) seems to 
be something like this: some property of small cars is such that (the STATE of) 
their having that property is what CAUSES parking them to be generally easy. 
( 1 )  says that small cars have a property that makes parking them generally easy; 
( lb) is odder than ( I c) because ( lb) requires us to impute some generic property 
to cars as a kind that makes ( I  c) true. 
Letting y* j translate the null reflexive, something like (3) seems to 
represent what is predicated in ( I )  of small cars generally. 
(3) AxAe. [easy(parking(y*j)(e) A x=Causer(e) A x=y*J 
Causer is here being treated as a thematic role. If we let cause be a relation 
between event(ualitie)s, then we have something like (4a), where P is a variable 
ranging over properties of individuals (cf. van Oosten' s suggestion of 
"responsibility"); (4b) specifies the associated CAUSE relation of individuals to 
the events of which they are "Causer".  
(4) a. x = Causer(e) iff 3P[P(x) & cause(e)(P(x))] 
b. CAUSE(x)(e) iff x = Causer(e) iff Causer(x)(e) 
What we usually call Agents are Causers in this sense. To be a 
prototypical volitional Agent such as we find in activities and achievements 
requires further that the property in question be an action, something that the 
Causer DOES. To be a Causer for a generic rniddle--the thematic role we're 
hypothesizing for overt middle subjects--the property that CAUSEs the modal state 
(the capacity to be easily or quickly or satisfactorily Ved by an arbitrary agent) 
is presumably something like a disposition that helps generically characterize the 
kind of which the middle is  predicated or, where predication applies just to some 
individual, a dispositional property in some sense characteristic of that individual 
(i.e., an individual-level or "generic" property of that individual) .  
Middles and tough-movement constructions are not the only place where 
the thematic role Causer seems relevant. Consider, e.g., subjects of transitives 
with Experiencer objects. 
(5) a. The stillness frightened Robin. 
b. Bureaucratic forms intimidate many people. 
The subjects here are Causers; such verbs also, of course, readily take volitionally 
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acting Causers (i.e. ,  Agents) as their subjects. If such verbs take Causer subjects, 
we need say no more; as it happens, Causers for these kinds of eventualities may 
be Agents but need not be. Note, incidentally, that such verbs form middles: 
(6) a. Robin frightens readily. 
b. Many people intimidate easily. 
Hale & Keyser ( 1 993) speculate that we may be able to replace thematic roles 
(e.g . ,  "Affected Theme") by structural relations (e.g., case-marked internal 
subject) . Taking this one step further, we might link the specificity of, e.g., 
Agent, to the presence at some level of representation of an aspectual operator DO 
Gust a special case of CAUSE) in keeping with the spirit of Dowty ( 1 979); Causer 
might just be the unmarked content of the subject of a CAUSE operator. I ' ll 
return this idea in the next section. 
Leaving these large theoretical issues aside, however, the bottom line is 
that I am disputing Massam' s characterization of middles (and tough-movement 
constructions) as having non-thematic subject positions. The middle subject 
position, I propose, receives a thematic role but not in the "main" expressed event, 
only in an imperfectly glimpsed and mostly implicit "sideshow. "  
3 .  Middle formation 
Let's use as our example the middle in ( 1 ) .  
( 1 )  Shakespeare translates easily. 
Events of translating Shakespeare are provided with explicit agents in active 
transitive sentences like those in (2). 
(2) Schiller translated Shakespeare. 
Kratzer ( 1 994) proposes that the VPs in such sentences will translate as in (3) .  
(3) A.e.translate(Shakespeare)( e) 
Roughly, the VPs will designate events of translating Shakespeare. In other 
words, besides the Davidsonian event argument the basic predicate translate needs 
only a single argument to saturate it; this argument is Hale & Keyser' s  internal 
subject or "Affected Theme."  
Hale & Keyser's syntactic analysis treats the objects of transitive verbs like 
that in (2) as "internal subjects" ; semantically, the verb plus object constitutes a 
complete or "saturated" predication that designates an event(uality) (or set thereof). 
The "external" subject is introduced to provide an argument to stand in the 
(abstract) cause relation to the event designated by the lower VP. To put it 
slightly differently, the operator [+caus] maps events into unary predicates holding 
of the Causers of such events. 
On the Non-Optionality of Certain Modifiers 
For Hale & Keyser, it' s  plausible that the lower VP would receive an 
interpretation essentially like that in (3). Kratzer adds in the external argument 
position via a phonologically null functional head dubbed VOICE into which the 
verb moves; for Hale and Keyser, as I have said, this external subject arises as the 
argument for the phonologically null higher abstract causative verb that 
"incorporates" with the basic intransitive predicate translate to yield a transitive 
causative verb. 
Something like (5) translates what Kratzer calls a VoiceP to which the 
subject NP will be adjoined. 
(5) AxAe. [translate(Shakespeare)(e) & Agent(x)(e)] 
A strikingly similar interpretive approach works well for Hale & Keyser's 
structure. For sentence (4), Hale and Keyser might want (6a) for the higher VP 
and (6b) for l '  (if they were doing semantics). 
(6) a. Ae.cause(translate(Shakespeare))( e) 
b. AxAe.cause(translate(Shakespeare))(e) & Causer(x)(e)) 
If we combine the subject NP with Kratzer's VoiceP and apply existential closure 
over the event variable we end up with (7) ; for Hale and Keyser, something like 
(8). 
(7) 3e[translate(Shakespeare )( e) & Agent(Schiller)( e)] 
(8) 3e[ cause(translate(Shakespeare))( e) & Causer(Schiller)( e)] 
Note that we are here using "cause" as the semantic correlate of Hale & Keyser' s  
abstract V [+caus] , assuming that the VP it heads denotes an event of  causing 
some other event--in this case, an event of causing Shakespeare to be translated. 
Such a cause itself takes an (external) argument, a Causer. We might, of course, 
want to require that the Causer be an Agent; i .e . ,  that the Causer' s DOing 
something be the event causing Shakespeare to be translated. And furthermore we 
certainly want some requirement about the immediacy of the cause. As was noted 
years ago (e.g . ,  in Fodor 1 970), a sentence like (2) is not synonymous with (9). 
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(9) Schiller caused Shakespeare to be translated. 
The verb cause is vague in a way the causative verb translate is not with respect 
to the Causer' s  role; Schiller might be patron or master of the actual translator in 
(9) but not in (2) where Schiller must himself have done the job. And there are 
other ways this semantic interpretation of Hale & Keyser's  decomposition needs 
to be further developed. This should do for present purposes, however. 
What then do we say about middles like ( 1 )? Massam's analysis suggests 
that a lexical middle might have the structure represented in ( 1 0),  where the active 
transitive is in some sense incorporated into the middle. 
( 1 0) y 
/�, 
V � I I 
translate REFL; 
This derived intransitive V comes with its own internal argument, the 
phonologically null reflexive Massam posits. Let 's  assume that the derived V 
translates more or less as in ( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 )  A.e.translate(y*)(e) 
But of course this representation doesn't in itself disallow embedding under 
Kratzer' s  higher ActiveVoice head (or under Hale & Keyser' s abstract higher 
causative). Why couldn't we get sentence ( 1 )  equivalent to something like ( 12), 
where the generic operator (presumably introduced as it usually is in kind generics 
or habituals) has scope over an ordinary active voice verb? 
( 12) GN [translate(Shakespeare)(e) & Agent(Shakespeare)(e)] [Easy(e)] 
Roughly, ( 1 2) says that events of Shakespeare' s  translating Shakespeare (the 
restrictor) are easy (the scope)--Le. ,  it' s easy for Shakespeare to translate 
Shakespeare. ( 12), however, is not a possible interpretation for ( 1 ) .  Of course, 
( 1 )  could be an active with an unspecified object; roughly, Shakespeare translates 
[stuff in general--whatever he tries to translate] easily. Shakespeare is the 
translator and we haven't really restricted what is translated. Or, as we've been 
assuming, it could be a middle that says Shakespeare is such that translating him 
[Le. ,  the stuff he wrote] is easy. But the intransitive verb with its null reflexive 
object that we've hypothesized as the form in middles can not be used in an active 
sentence with an external argument that is Agent of its designated event(s); i.e., 
(1) cannot be interpreted as equivalent to ( 1 2),  with Shakespeare both translator 
and translated. 
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What we want to end up with is a representation of sentence ( 1 )  along the 
lines of ( 1 3) (I 'm using "s" to range over stative eventualities). 
( 1 3) 3s[s=[GN [translate(Shakespeare)(e)] [Easy(e)] ]  & Causer(Shakespeare)(s) 
If we follow the spirit of Hale & Keyser' s  proposal, we might hypothesize 
that the (apparently intransitive) middle V already includes an abstract causative 
in its structure as well as the null reflexive object, with the structure looking like 
( 1 4) rather than ( 1 0).  
( 1 4) v 
r 
�-----
1 ,()Z�n 
I ! IT 
[+caus] translate REFLi 
The impossibility of embedding such a V under an abstract causative could then 
be linked to the fact that ordinary transitive causatives don't themselves causativize 
(see Hale & Keyser for discussion) . (If we pursue Kratzer' s  framework, a similar 
story has to be told about why such a verb cannot embed under an ActiveVoice 
head.) In other words, we should provide (1 5) rather than ( 1 1 )  as a first 
approximation of a translation of ( 1 4) .  
( 1 5) t..e.cause(translate(y*)(e» 
We can for expository purposes, however, ignore this extra twist and assume the 
implicit causativity of our derived V. What is crucial about having the causativity 
"inside" the single lexical item is that we cannot add that causativity in order to 
add an external argument of the (causative) translating. The lexical item already 
encodes in some sense a completely specified event (modulo the eventual 
specification of y* and the absence of any information about particular Agents or 
Causers of the "action"). 
Setting aside the eventives, which seem simply to be detransitivized and 
thus simple intransitives of the unaccusative or ergative variety, we fmd that 
middle constructions do attribute causality to their subjects. That causality, 
however, is not with respect to bringing about particular events of V -ing the 
subject; e.g., events of translating something (something that itself is to be 
identified with the subject). Rather the subject's causal role (e.g., Shakespeare's  
contribution) i s  with respect to such events' generically having some particular 
property--e.g., being easy or being good or being like events of V -ing some other 
kind of individual (recall, e.g. , "this dissertation reads like a Harlequin romance" 
and similar cases). That is, the subject does not play a direct role in the event of 
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V-ing something except as it serves to identify what is Ved; the thematic role of 
the subject is its causing events of V-ing it generically to have some property. 
This caused event-property is the analogue in middles of what Massam' s tough­
element designates. 
Something like a MiddleOperator generically quantifies over a VP, which 
typically includes not only the derived intransitive V (with its internal null 
reflexive object) but also an adverbial that attributes some property to events of 
the sort designated by that V. Thus somewhere under IP we have a syntactic 
structure roughly like ( 1 6), where the derived V lexically includes a structure like 
that in ( 1 4) .  
( 1 6) ?? 
Middf;O� I �vP 
GN translate easily 
Structure ( 1 6) will be assigned an interpretation roughly as in ( 1 7) .  
( 1 7) As[s=[GN [translate(y*)(e)] [Easy(e)]] 
Eventually we add in the wherewithal for a subject argument, perhaps at 1 ' .  
( 1 8) AXAS[S=[GN [translate(y*)(e)] [Easy(e)]] & Causer(x)(s) & x=y* 
Finally, of course, we add in the subject argument and apply existential closure 
and end up with something like what we proposed above in ( 13). 
The representation in ( l 3) indicates that what restricts the generic 
quantification in middles is the derived V: generalization is over events of 
translating whatever is to be added in as a subject. The adverbial predication then 
provides the nuclear scope for the generic operator--we are saying that, restricting 
attention to events of translating (it*), such events are easy. 
Middles must have modification then in order to give a scope over which 
the generic quantifier can operate. The middle modifiers provide a predicate not 
unlike the tough-predicate. Although some of the content of the scope might be 
provided contextually, we cannot have a completely implicit nuclear scope. The 
scope, after all, is the major content of what is asserted. Restrictors for generic 
(and other) quantifiers are typically presupposed and thus can be provided 
contextually. That is, it' s assumed that there's  a non-empty class of events of 
translating Shakespeare; what's of interest is what such events are like.2 
If modifiers in middles specify scope content for the generic quantifier, 
how can we ever have optional modifiers in middles? The rather neat picture 
inspired by the tough-movement parallel is complicated by cases where no explicit 
modifier is needed. ( 1 9) repeats some earlier examples. 
( 1 9) a. 
b. 
c. 
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This silk washes. 
This dress buttons. 
That car HANDLES. 
Consider ( 1 9a) first. As we've noted earlier, it' s one of a number of cases where 
the middle seems to come out more or less equivalent to the -able suffix. We 
don't presuppose events of silk-washing; rather we presuppose something like 
successful events of silk-cleaning and assert that such events generically can be 
events of silk-washing. As has often been noted in discussion of middles, cases 
like ( 1 9a) arise when there is a context of classifying things of the sort designated 
by the subject NP with respect to how suited they are to being Ved. ( 1 9b) is 
similar; the context must be something like consideration of successful events of 
closing up a dress and the assertion is that such events generically can be 
buttonings of the dress. The point is that the main verb is not needed as the 
restrictor because context has provided restriction via implicit contrast among 
different modes of doing something, the main V then being free to designate one 
such mode (serving then to give content to the scopal element). 
The case of HANDLES seems somewhat different; handle (when it does not 
mean simply "manipulate with the hands") is similar to behave. It requires some 
kind of manner modification to saturate its argument structure. Like behave, 
however, handle can lack an explicit indication of the manner of handling (though 
for handle something like stress seems necessary) but will then be understood as 
including a positive evaluative implicitly ("handle well"). But since we need 
something like the "well" (implicit or explicit) for complete event specification we 
can't understand ( 1 9c) as saying that events of handling the car referred to are all 
good events. Instead ( 1 9c) seems to presuppose events of driving or something 
like that and asserts that such events are also events where the car is successfully 
"handled."  
( 1 9c) is similar to (20a), where the prepositional phrase occurring is not an 
event modifier but an argument that designates a participant in the event; note that 
the transitive (20b) requires the same class of locatives. 
(20) a. 
b. 
This rack attaches *(to the Wall) . 
Joan attached the rack *(to the wall). 
Once we see that the locative is an argument and not our needed modifier, cases 
like (20a) look much like the examples in ( 19). The context provides some 
restrictor (events of successful/orthodox permanently locating the rack), and the 
sentence asserts that such events generically can be events of attaching it to the 
wall. 
Thus in general modifiers are needed in middles to provide some explicit 
indication of the asserted scope--of the property being ascribed to events of the 
kind V designates. If a contextually provided restrictor frees up the V to function 
as part of the scope, this requirement may be relaxed and the V itself may provide 
content for the scope. This is likely to happen only when there is some question 
of whether a particular individual or kind of individual can be (successfully) V -ed, 
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which is why modifierless middles generally indicate some kind of possibility. 
When the possibility of successful V -ing is not at issue, then successful V -ing (of 
an individual or kind to be identified with subject) is assumed and a property 
ascribed generically to such events. 
4. Conclusion 
Are there more than superficial resemblances between modifier neediness 
in the case of middles and in the others we've mentioned? Really to answer that 
question would require a much deeper and detailed account of middles and of the 
other cases where what look like modifiers appear to be non-optional. 
Given that we've explained middle modifiers as needed to provide a 
nuclear scope for a generic operator by specifying an event-property, we' d  expect 
to fmd some relation between modifier neediness in middles and in ordinary kind 
generics and habituals. Carlson ( 1 989), however, argues that kind generics need 
modifiers mainly to help specify the restrictor, deriving scope content from either 
the predicate or the subject. Of course, if obligatoriness of modifiers is tied to 
their specifying scope and the possibility of contextual specification limited to 
identifying restrictors, the relative lesser modifier-neediness of kind generics as 
compared to middles would follow. 
Grimshaw and Vikner ( 1 993) proposed that passives need modifiers only 
when the internal structure of the events in question is "branching"--e.g. ,  a process 
followed by some culminating state. But they do not really give an account of 
why modifiers are needed to "identify" these distinct event-parts nor how that 
"identification" is accomplished by the modifiers. Nor do they show why the 
passive should differ from the active in this respect. If it is agent-implicitness that 
matters, why and how does it matter? Perhaps here too modifier-neediness can 
be shown to depend on details of discourse presuppositions, syntactic structures, 
and the map they help induce to logical form. 
Modifier-neediness in the verbal domain seems to force us to consider in 
some detail the semantic structure of events and event operators and the relation 
of syntactic structure to event-constructs. It also raises discourse-theoretic issues; 
here, we have mentioned presupposition and hinted at the relevance of other 
discourse-related phenomena. 
Endnotes 
* Comments from audiences at Cornell and at SALT 4 have improved this 
paper; as is customary, I absolve those commenters from responsibility for what 
I have done with their suggestions. I also thank Rosanne Pelletier for sharing with 
me an unpublished paper she wrote on the need of middles for modifiers at the 
beginning of her graduate career at Yale and Christine Fellbaum and Diane 
Massam for sending me their work on middles and related topics. 
1 .  See Grimshaw & Vikner 1 993 for suggestions on how to characterize the 
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contrast between passives that do need modifiers and those that don't; they also 
propose part of an answer to the question of why those modifiers might be needed. 
2. Although her analysis of middles is somewhat different from what is proposed 
here, Condarovdi 1 989 also sees middle modifiers as needed in order to give 
content to the nuclear scope of a generic. She does not, however, say anything 
about the conditions under which something else can specify scope content. 
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